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 Abstract  
Immigration case-workers in the UK hear endless stories about flight and persecution by people 
claiming asylum. However, asylum claims are fragile due to the logocentric foreclosures to the 
acoustic registers in asylum testimonies. In view of the fragility of refugee narratives of flight, 
legal safeguards aim to create the right conditions for LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ testimonies. Yet, this arti-
cle suggests refugee status determination processes side-line the sound of vulnerability by 
falsely interpreting testimonies that appear to be incomprehensible as untrue or as exceptional 
accounts of vulnerability. But silenced or fragmented testimonies are not necessarily untrue or 
devoid of meaning; their meaning is tied to the marginalization of phone in the logocentric 
logic in law. Instead of accepting the voices of asylum-seekers as aphonic, this article heeds 
the call to hear the acoustic uniqueness of testimonies, drawing on Adriana &DYDUHUR¶V vocal 
philosophy.  
Keywords  
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Oh miserable, what cry am I to utter?  
What sound, what lament...1 
1. Introduction: The fragility of pleading for a safe space  
Asylum seekers must present credible testimonies in order to gain refugee status and benefit 
from the protections available under international and domestic legal frameworks. To qualify 
for refugee status, or other subsidiary protections, asylum-seekers must demonstrate a ³ZHOO-
founded fear of SHUVHFXWLRQ´ As defined under international refugee law, a refugee is a person 
who: 
µ>«@ owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; 
or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual resi-
dence, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it¶.2 
Human rights guidelines and principles in different legal systems are geared to create the con-
ditions for a fair hearing.  However, scholarship in this field notes how miscommunication, 
mistranslation, mishearing, of the asylum-seeker testimony often undermine the process for 
determining refugee status. In some cases, interviewers fail to ask the right questions to avoid 
talking about sensitive topics such as sexual violence.3 Researchers interpret this avoidance as 
a coping mechanism meant to prevent empathic responses towards stories of trauma from asy-
lum-seekers. 4  Elsewhere, scholars propose that a culture of disbelief predisposes decision-
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makers to hear falsity from gaps within testimonies. Silences, µJDSV¶ in the stories, and contra-
dictions become signs of suspected dishonesty in accounts of persecution told by asylum-seek-
ers. When an asylum-seeker cannot speak fluently in the language of the potential host, it is 
the role of the interpreter to equalize the asylum-VHHNHU¶V position vis-à-vis the state, by re-
specting their rights to due process in accordance with the law, including, the right to a fair 
hearing. But, hearing, translating, and interpreting what a story of persecution is a complex and 
by no means a direct and unmediated transformation of one language into another. 
 Indeed, the stakes are high in the process of telling and hearing stories of persecution 
as failure to hear and µWUDQVODWH¶ a story, because it may sound false or incoherent to the ears of 
the law, may lead to the marginalization of asylum seekers. Hightower and Anker suggest that 
legal marginalization implies that someone standing on the edge of the law is not yet clearly 
recognized as being bound to a polity and an enforceable system of rules. Etymologically, 
margo, from which the word ³PDUJLQ´ derives, means ³edge, which means people stand in a 
paradoxical position which is neither inside nor outside yet nevertheless in a relation with the 
law.5 However, Hightower and Anker stress that what is at the edge can be also be moved, 
related and associated in different ways. This means legal marginalization is not static. Viewed 
this way, lines and borders create the conditions for inclusion and exclusion but these demar-
cations also create the ³SRVVLELOLW\ of hybrids, associations and WUDQVJUHVVLRQV´6 In this sense, 
translation is the concept best suited to mobilize those subjectivities suspended in margins of 
the law, since translatio in Latin and metapharein in Greek  mean to µSDVV RYHU¶ or µFDUU\ RYHU¶7 
Even though translation exists because there is a boundary or line that impose rules and barriers 
to the movement of people or how they should or VKRXOGQ¶W tell a story of persecution, I regard 
the activity of translation as that which mobilizes the vocal register of speech, and with it, 
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 ibid 2. 
marginalized stories of persecution are able to cross over the boundaries of the law. 
 Modern linguistics describes the voice as the prime carrier of speech. The phonetic 
component of language is taken to be the basic unit of language where sounds become syllables 
and syllables assembled together become nouns and verbs, which in turn are assembled ac-
cording to the rules of syntax to compose meaningful sentences.8 Thus, voice is a necessary 
condition of a plea for refuge. However, credibility assessment procedures undercut the ability 
to hear that voice. Recognized as one of the most challenging aspects of refugee determination 
procedures, these assessments mirror a legal convention that valorizes linear and coherent nar-
ratives. Wherever contradictions emerge in the story of persecution, decision-makers run the 
risk of mishearing what was said. These failures could give the impression that the law is deaf 
in one ear.  Instead, it might be that specific conventions in legal thinking have desensitized 
the law to what it perceives as incoherent and incomprehensible sounds. Deaf legal ears can 
hear only the loudest sounds, the cries that signify exceptional accounts of vulnerability. Con-
versely, aphonic testimonies, silenced throughout the process, tend to get marginalized. Instead 
of accepting the voices of asylum-seekers as aphonic, this article heeds the call to µhear the 
right gaps¶.9 Silenced testimonies are not devoid of sound; the sound is in the margins. At the 
same time, I do not wish to suggest the process of translating silent gaps in the testimony into 
sound is necessarily benign or hostile. Instead, it is simply the activity of moving the phonic 
components of asylum-VHHNHUV¶ stories within across, or beyond, the lines demarcated by the 
law. Thus, translation denotes the possibility of moving silenced testimonies away from the 
edges of law by recovering the sound of vulnerability.10   
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 In discourse, the word testimony in asylum cases embodies two different meanings. One comes from the Latin 
testis, which µVLJQLILHV a person who in a trial or lawsuit between rival parties, is in the position of the third SDUW\¶ 
The second meaning derives from superstes, which refers to a survivor who is also witness to an event. Giorgio 
 To flesh out the traces of sound in the silence, the first section examines vocal philos-
ophy by Adriana Cavarero,11 and suggests that legal hearing is wedded to the metaphysical 
voice of reason. Testimonies that do not cohere with the conventions set by the metaphysical 
voice of reason, a mode of thinking also found in the legal context, are at greater risk of being 
silenced.  Specifically, I argue that the refugee status determination process sidelines the sound 
of vulnerability by falsely interpreting testimonies that appear to be incomprehensible as false.  
In the second and third sections, I examine two instances that illustrate the hypothesis stated 
above. The first one shows how the sound of vulnerability is sidelined in the contemporary 
refugee determination process. Based on research focused on communication discontinuities 
throughout the refugee determination process in the United Kingdom (UK), I first question 
how testimonies are stylized and sanitized by this heavily regulated environment. The process 
itself may render these accounts incomplete as incoherent accounts of persecution, but these 
failures are usually attributed to the potential falsehood of the testimony. Instead of interpreting 
silences and incoherent stories as potentially false accounts, I suggest adjudication authorities 
fail to hear the sound and fury underpinning pleas for refuge. Thus, the second instance recov-
ers the sound of vulnerability underpinning asylum-VHHNHUV¶ testimonies through Ancient 
Greek literary sources and explains why the law conceals these sounds.  Drawing parallels 
between the status determination process today and the tale of The Suppliant Maidens by Aes-
chyus, I argue that marginal sounds in refugee testimonies are moved to the edge of logos, 
since they appear to be superfluous and excessive Overall, my goal is to find a way to fine-
tune judicial ears. Instead of hearing the ³gaps´ in an asylum story as silences or incoherencies 
as evidence of falsehood in asylum-VHHNHUV¶ stories of persecution I argue, borrowing a famous 
line from 0DFEHWK¶V that these gaps are full of µVRXQG and IXU\¶ Contrary to this view from 
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Shakespeare, these acoustic gaps are full of meaning and significance. The problem is these 
stories are not heard by decision-makers because asylum law expects testimonies to have spe-
cific qualities to be considered credible. Methodologically, this article draws insights from the 
well-established field of law and literature,12 with the emerging field of µDFRXVWLF jurispru-
GHQFH¶.13 On one hand, it focuses on the conditions of story-telling in the refugee-status deter-
mination process; on the other, it relies on conceptual tools that expose marginalized sounds. 
Lamentation, a poetic and acoustic component of Greek tragedy, represents an intersection 
between the acoustic, literary, and legal elements of asylum-requests.  
2. Auricular justice: An ear for a mouth 
Communication can be fragile in certain situations. The urgency to speak and to be heard is 
most acute when a person suffers. This section examines how speech may be fragmented or 
even destroyed in traumatic events. Speech appears as a prerequisite for justice. Without it, we 
run the risk of deepening the sense of abandonment of those who have been wronged by others 
or are running away from challenging life- circumstances. However, I explain that some utter-
ances go unheard because they appear as asemantic vocal emissions. Based on &DYDUHUR¶V cri-
tique of Western metaphysics, this section explains how the phonic utterances demoted to asig-
nifying sounds subservient to speech. Consequently, voices are not heard as unique expressions 
of living and breathing beings, whose lives matter regardless of what they say or how they 
justify their need for protection. 
If I am drowning in the sea, I will call for help. In May 2016, two young Eritrean men, 
Filmon and Selomon, were escaping mandatory conscription in Eritrea and boarded a wooden 
boat on the coast of Libya with 400-550 people. This boat was towed by another boat believed 
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to carry other 500. After three hours, the towed boat began to sink. Selomon vividly recalls the 
cries of women and children, a sound that shocked and haunts him and the other survivors: 
µI started to cry when I saw the situation and when I found the ship without an engine. 
There were many women and children¶.14 
It is believed up to 550 people died in that incident. The news report does not say when they 
were saved, but Filemon said they were sinking for at least six hours off the Italian coast before 
he swam to the other crowded boat.15 More than 5,000 asylum-seekers died in 2016 trying to 
cross the Mediterranean.16   
 Survivors from near drowning experiences describe the pain from the cold water on 
limbs and the tightening of the chest as the lungs start to give in. The physiological reactions 
demand solutions, usually through the help of others. Pain is said to be a fundamentally isolat-
ing experience, because it destroys the ability to communicate with others through meaningful 
speech; one shouts, gesticulates, or moans.17  Humans, as Lyotard notes, discover through µthe 
feeling of pain which accompanies silence (and of pleasure which accompanies the invention 
of a new idiom), that they are summoned by language >«@¶18 So, before the phrase ³help´ is 
uttered, there is a silence and the feeling of pain, a differend, a neologism which expresses µthe 
unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be able to be put into 
phrases cannot yet be¶.19 In the absence of a phrase, the feeling becomes a wrong because it 
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cannot be represented through language,20 and thus, communicated to others. Explained other-
wise, the pain is compounded by the intensity of the experience and the failure to communicate 
it. In the absence of a phrase to express the anguish of pain, one may suffer from the specific 
wrong of ethical loneliness which . Jill Stauffer defines as µthe experience of being abandoned 
compounded by the experience of not being heard¶21 I interpret the sense of abandonment as 
that which follows from the incommensurability between pain and language. Unlike the lone-
liness and solitude which is part of the human condition, ethical loneliness is dehumanizing. 
This harm is characterized by abandonment insofar as one can no longer trust the ability of 
humanity to respond.22 Ethical loneliness represents the silence that falls after a cry for help is 
ignored because it is not heard in the first place. 
 According to Adriana Cavarero, mishearing is endemic to Western thought because it 
has demoted the singularity of the voice. She explains that the philosophical tradition of meta-
physics excised voice from speech, characterizing the phonetic as a generic sound and thus a 
mere vehicle for speech. Subservient to signification, the acoustic is by itself meaningless. To 
become meaningful, sounds or syllables need to join words and phrases together, organizing 
them logically through grammatic rules. The metaphysical tradition which µdevocalized 
logos¶23 also conflated language with reason. Like language, logic follows rules and procedures 
¶among which the principle of non-contradiction stands out because it assures the validity of 
the signifying process¶24 Presuming that speech is the destination of the voice, the philosoph-
ical tradition of metaphysics ¶has the tendency to totalize this destination so that outside of 
speech, the voice is nothing but an insignificant leftover¶25    




 Jill Stauffer, Ethical Loneliness: The Injustice of Not Being Heard (Columbia University Press 2015) 9. 
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 ibid 2. 
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 Cavarero (n 8) 44. 
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 ibid 188. 
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 ibid 12. 
 For the voice to acquire meaning, it needs to be attached to a signifier (a word that in 
turn refers to a concept in the mind) and is joined to other words in a logical order. Phone is 
then captured in a system of signification.26 If the voice fails to become speech, logocentric 
logic wrongly regards acoustics as superfluous excess to be ignored and transformed into lack 
of meaning. As Cavarero then explains, µ>«] the sphere of the voice is constitutively broader 
than that of speech: it exceeds it. To reduce this excess to mere meaninglessness²to whatever 
remains when the voice is not intended toward meaning, defined as the exclusive purview of 
speech²is one of the chief vices of logocentrism¶.27 
 The devocalization of logos turned vocality into the opposite of reason.. For logos is 
mute as it coincides with the µvisible order of the ideas contemplated by pure thought¶.28 Con-
cepts and ideas are mostly abstract objects of thought signified through speech, while reason 
³speaks´ through those ideas that are logically entwined. In this set-up, the voice becomes a 
conduit for the internal world of the mind, whereas speech becomes indistinguishable from 
thinking. Unable to hear because of the ³metaphysical filter´ that separates speech and thought 
from the voice, the acoustic vibration of voices singing in concert appears meaningless on their 
own.  
 Characteristically, Cavarero reconstructs the symbolic meanings attached to mythol-
ogy, bringing characters whose function had been marginal to narrative, idea or philosophical 
discourse of life.29  Her reading of the fable of Echo and Narcissus, as told by Ovid, is particularly 
poignant because it allegorizes the subordination and marginalization of vocality. According 
to the myth, Echo is a loquacious and rhetorically skilled nymph who tricks the Goddess Juno 
into believing something that was not true. Juno punishes Echo, condemning her to repeat the 
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 Adriana Cavarero, In Spite of Plato: A Feminist Rewriting of Ancient Philosophy (Serena Anderlini '¶2QRIULR and 
Aine 2¶+HDO\ trs, Routledge 1995). 
words of others and never her own. Much later, Echo meets and falls in love with Narcissus, a 
young man known for his charm and beauty. But she cannot express her feelings through 
speech. Instead, she flings her arms around him. But he rejects this expression of affection. 
Broken-hearted, (FKR¶V body fades away and all is left of her mimicking voice. Meanwhile, 
Narcissus rejects another love-stricken admirer who in turn asks the gods to punish the object 
of his desire. In response, the gods make Narcissus fall in love with his own image, reflected 
in a pond. Obsessed and unable to possess his object of affection, he dies. Echo sees this scene 
but cannot express anything or console him. All she can do is mimic what Narcissus says.
 According to Cavarero, (FKR¶V condition signifies existence as a voice purely subser-
vient to others, and represents an allegory of logocentric-based politics trapped in a solipsistic 
dialogue. Better said, her voice is a monologue that gives the appearance of being a dialogue. 
Echo¶V voice is not her own; instead it is µa forced and unintentional repetition¶.30 In the end, 
tragically, the mediation of a mirror prevents an authentic encounter between the characters of 
the tale. First, the mirror reflects Narcissus, deepening his love for himself. Meanwhile, the 
existence of Echo is reduced to that of an acoustic mirror, which enables Narcissus to hear only 
his own words, even if they are carried by the voice of a girl he believes to be shy. In sum, he 
only sees and hears his own reflection. Meanwhile, as Cavarero remarks, Echo becomes a dis-
embodied voice that has lost all uniqueness, represented by the loss of her body, and therefore 
the ability to signify meaning.   
 Significantly, this myth shows how the ontology of voice cannot be reduced to this 
functional role. In short, the voice is not simply a vehicle for speech nor is it subservient to 
discourse. Instead, by foregrounding the uniqueness of the voice, Cavarero is also stressing its 
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role in politics. As Dohoney explains, &DYDUHUR¶V project underscores political plurality under-
stood as a political sphere µcomposed of unique and unrepeatable selves¶31 Liberal politics 
equalizes individual characteristics under the juridical figure of the universal person of 
law.32As often argued by feminists, this abstract figure has no body. The effacement of the 
body enabled logocentrism to liberate mute speech µfrom the corporeality of breath and the 
voice¶33 Thus, the recovery of the singular and unrepeatable materiality of each voice is at the 
heart of her project.  
 To deconstruct logocentrism, she traces back the instances where the object of her in-
quiry (vocality) disappeared or morphed within the history of thought. These traces are not 
found only in philosophical texts, but also in literature as shown through her analysis of 2YLG¶V 
Metamorphosis.. By marking the present absences which survive in literature, Cavarero µnar-
rates stories of singular lives¶ and µconfers meaning on this materiality¶34 Thus, this decon-
struction is not limited to a diagnostic identification of the repression of vocality in logocen-
trism, because it substantiates the ontology of vocality and hence lays the groundwork for its 
revaluation. A mere reversal that affirms the role of the voice is clearly insufficient to re-vo-
calize thought. A voice needs to mean something on its own, but only if it is grounded in the 
body of a unique person who breathes. As Dohoney remarks, the voice is an µindication of 
someone there to be heard and seen¶35 Each voice in the body politic is unique, since µthe act 
of speaking is relational: what communicates first and foremost, beyond the content that the 
words communicate, is the acoustic, empirical, material relationality of singular voices¶36 This 
means that singular voices which come together to speak do not depend on understanding the 
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message, but on the basic ability to listen to a voice itself and not its semantic register. 
   
3. Funneled hearing: Narrative coherence, fragmentation and disbelief in the asylum-
determination process 
 
Judicial discourse on justice is built around the tropes of hearing and speaking. Marianne Con-
stable remarks, for example, how liberal political institutions constantly ¶assert the need for 
citizens to speak¶ because speech is understood as the hallmark of political subjectivity.37 Con-
versely, ¶silence often appears either as a lack to be remedied or as itself a form of µYRLFH¶ that 
signifies acquiescence and consent¶38 Thus, one of the responsibilities of the state is to create 
the conditions that propitiate speech, as well as the conditions for listening to others when they 
speak. The right to be heard is fundamental. Article 6 of the Human Rights Act outlines the 
right to a fair trial, which is considered a key element of liberal democracies and represents an 
essential component of the rule of law, because they secure individual access to an impartial 
court of law; an opportunity to be heard and to hear others (witnesses, charges, arguments by 
the opponents, the FRXUW¶V judgement) as well as the right to remain silent.  Nevertheless, as 
Stauffer remarks, the institutions designed to hear and repair a harm may ironically µuse pro-
cedures that silence some stories and, even when a resistant story gets told, and, miraculously 
heard, the larger world may not be willing to hear it for what it is¶39  This section builds on 
this idea, signposting sites of irony in the refugee status determination process. It suggests that 
the process is often compromised by the rules that demand coherence and clarity as a precon-
dition for presenting testimonies. First, it examines the interview and interpretation procedures 
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 Stauffer (n 25) 82. 
noting how these events disaggregate the testimony, potentially silencing the voices of refu-
gees. Second, it argues that the culture of disbelief is a noise that disables the hearing capabil-
ities of decision-makers. Predisposed to hearing lies and identifying the ³bogus´ asylum-
seeker, decision-makers increasingly mishear the vulnerability present in refugee testimonies. 
When they miraculously hear these stories of vulnerability, it is only because they are amplified 
by presenting them as exceptional stories of suffering, but these stories are still not heard for 
what they are. In the end, the decision-making process resembles the story of Narcissus and 
Echo. Stuck in the rut of hearing itself, the voice of asylum seekers is side-lined by the legal 
procedures, transforming these testimonies into echoes without meaning to legal ears.  
 As said before, the process of refugee status determination rests almost entirely on ma-
terial facts in the personal testimony. Recognizing the centrality of the testimony in the status 
determination process, international, regional and domestic bodies have instituted procedural 
safeguards meant to ensure asylum seekers have access to fair asylum hearings. UK immigra-
tion law (apart from the Refugee Convention)40 is bound to European Council Procedures Di-
rective 2005/85/EC.41 This Directive sets out the obligations and responsibilities of applicants 
and national authorities in charge of approving or rejecting requests for asylum. Basic princi-
ples include the right to have access to the asylum-determination procedure (Art 6);42 the right 
to remain in the Member State territory until the decision is made (Art 7);43 proper examination 
of the application and written explanation for refusal, as well as access to the interview report 
(Art 8 and 14);44 access to interpreters and legal representation (Art 10 and 15 respectively).45 
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Articles 12 states applicants are entitled to be heard through a personal interview conducted by 
a competent authority under national law. 46 
 UK Home Office caseworkers are the first to decide whether someone qualifies for 
refugee status or humanitarian protection. If rejected, applicants can appeal to the Immigration 
and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. Legal representatives, judges, interpreters, UK 
Border Agency caseworkers, and interpreters, align their work around the µexpected jurispru-
dential parameters¶;47 provided by the definition of a refugee in the Convention.  Johnson ar-
gues decision-makers µexpect a particular type of testimony¶, meaning that the laws and norms 
governing asylum law create a sort of model which sets the parameters of how to interpret 
asylum-seekers.48Specifically, accounts of persecution are expected to have linear structure in 
which series of events help decision-makers identify a SHUVRQ¶V realistic fear of persecution. 
Linear narratives show a clear cause and an effect in a story of flight. This requirement is 
evident in the screening and substantive interviews carried out after applying for asylum in the 
UK. After filing a petition, UK Border Agency immigration officers carry out a ³screening 
interview". The screening interview is structured to collect basic personal details of asylum 
applicants, trace their journey into the UK, assess the internal credibility of this story and to 
check whether they have applied for asylum in another European Union (EU) or non-EU coun-
try. At this point, applicants are asked if they prefer a female or male case worker. The Home 
Office assigns a case-worker in charge of conducting the ³first reporting event´, where appli-
cants meet their case worker who will afterwards carry out a substantive interview. The purpose 
of this interview is to examine in more detail the asylum claim between the screening and the 
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substantive interview varies. Based on the screening interview, authorities assess whether an 
applicant qualifies for the fast track asylum procedure. If so, the asylum-seeker will be detained 
in a high security facility until the procedure is finalized. The substantive interview of the fast-
track process happens only a few days after the screening.49 Vulnerable asylum seekers who 
have complex asylum cases end up in detention facilities because the decision is based on the 
screening interview, which only ascertains basic facts as noted before.50  
 If processed through the normal time-frame, the substantive interview is likely to hap-
pen within a month after the screening interview. Applicants can submit other documents such 
as written testimonies or any additional supporting evidence not submitted at the screening 
stage.51 No one excepts interpreters and legal advisers to be present at this interview, to protect 
the confidentiality and privacy of who testifies. Unlike the structured nature of the questions 
in the screening interview, the substantive interview is meant to pose open questions.52 Asy-
lum-seekers can speak more candidly, and explain their story in more length and detail. The 
Home Office describes it as ¶the main opportunity for the claimant to provide evidence about 
why they need international protection¶53 Still, interviewers must investigate links between the 
personal experiences of applicants and verifiable details such as published events or inci-
dents¶54 This is for corroborating material facts of the claim by matching them with the polit-
ical situation of a foreign country and/or existing case law on particular social groups who are 
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 Asylum-seekers are entitled to an interpreter, provided for by the Home Office. The 
aim is to assist decision-makers when hearing an asylum claim and ensure foreign-speaking 
claimants are not disadvantaged. Guidelines instruct interpreters and translators not to alter the 
authenticity of the account, and require their intervention to reflect the actual language used, 
whether it is colloquial, formal, etc.56 Unmediated verbatim translations ought to mirror the 
presumption that interviews are a neutral and objective µfact-finding exercise¶´57 However, 
grammatical errors and colloquial speech stretch the role of the interpreter throughout the in-
terview. Whilst expected to provide a ´verbatim¶ unedited interpretation, some testimonies by 
some people may appear so µso disjointed from how they came across in the interview¶58  
 Gibb and Good illustrate well the problems that arise from fragmenting testimonies to 
make them clear in a comparative study that examines the conflicting rules that regulate the 
role of translators and interpreters in the UK and France,To facilitate their interpretation, testi-
monies are fragmented into short and easy-to-translate sentences, but this alters the overall 
flow and coherence of the account.59 Thus, interpreters complain that the format of the inter-
view fragments the narrative coherence of testimony from asylum-seekers, 60 and say they are 
blamed for the disrupting narratives.  One interpreter in this study opined fragmentation fa-
vored µthe Home Office because people do not speak like that naturally, and they will lose track 
>«]¶61 Overall, interpreters are under the pressure of contradictory demands: to act as ³disem-
bodied´ translating machines but also encouraged to anticipate and have a more active, yet 
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limited, participation to clarify a narrative.62 Finally, their work is limited by language since 
they are not able translate emotion. Like the asylum-seekers, interpreters must express facts, 
setting aside emotional speech acts which cannot be translated into prose. 63 
 Coming back to a point noted in the interpretation-translation process, communication 
standards require testimonies to reflect a coherent and clear factual narrative, expressed 
through the language of the country where a petition is filed. Asylum-seekers are not expected 
to speak like lawyers. Instead, legal representatives (barristers, solicitors, immigration advis-
ers) translate their case into the technical language of the law. In their interviews, all asylum-
seekers must present clear and coherent statements. As stated by the Home Office, µinterviews 
are recorded verbatim and clarity is crucial, especially names, places, or organisations¶64 For 
this reason, interviewers are encouraged to clarify inconsistencies and plausibility to answers 
in the interviews, particularly Country of Origin Information (COI) and other information in 
written documents.65 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) procedures 
also encourage interviewers to clarify inconsistencies and contradictions that might otherwise 
conceal µmisrepresentation or concealment of material facts¶66 Contradictions, assessed on the 
basis of the internal and external coherence and plausibility of the story, may undermine the 
credibility of the account. But, failure to present clear and non-contradictory testimonies does 
not necessarily render the account a lie. Decision-makers are told to base decisions on common 
sense. 67  All asylum seekers are expected to present credible account that it is likely to have 
happened and on balance capable of being believed. This is a low standard of proof and even 
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if there is insufficient evidence for one aspect of the claim, the Home Office states it should 
not be determinative.  Instead, they must assess the material fact µin the context of the evidence 
as a whole and not in isolation¶68  
 Although the refugee determination process architecture provides detailed safeguards 
meant to enable asylum seekers to speak their testimony and to be heard, critics say there is an 
organizational µFXOWXUH of GLVEHOLHI¶ that undermines these goals.69 This culture is characterized 
by the prejudice against economic migrants, who are blamed for making fake asylum claims 
to prevent deportation.70 Adherence to this view is evinced by xenophobic political discourse 
in the UK.71  Caseworkers are arguably not isolated from this highly-politicized context. Some 
of the evidence of this µFXOWXUH of GLVEHOLHI¶ cited by asylum researchers includes reports by 
asylum-seekers about hostile interviews as well as rejection letters that show a µKRVWLOH¶ tone72 
Past UNHCR reports confirmed that first instance decision-makers have taken an incorrect 
approach to credibility assessments because they comb through inconsistencies to cast doubt 
on the integrity of asylum-seekers as witnesses, instead of focusing on the facts.73  Caseworkers 
also use µunnecessary and unsupported conclusions¶ stating the account is  µLQYHQWHG¶ or µIDE
ricated¶74  Contrary to established guidelines, case owners place a high burden of proof on 
applicants. Souter concedes that policy reforms have been rolled out to address these organi-
zational practices.75 These practices may also be indicative of many things other than a problem 
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originating in legal reasoning. They very likely indicate a mixture of prejudices against immi-
grants and asylum seekers, inadequate training, among other things.  
 More recently, fieldwork by Baillot, Cowan and Munro shows how decision-makers 
are embedded in complex institutional cultures where other factors intervene, including com-
passion fatigue and the absence of institutional mechanisms to train and adequately support 
decision-makers.76 Unable to cope with hearing traumatic stories from asylum-seekers, case 
owners adopt detachment strategies that coincidentally align with the institutional culture of 
disbelief. Elsewhere, the authors also claim decision-makers avoid asking detailed questions 
about traumatic events, such as rape, due to their own unease around the topic.77 These studies 
give some credence to what Souter argues, that rather than a culture of disbelief, there is a 
culture of epistemic denial, which involves the µprior prevention of information from even 
being recognised or taken into account during the development of belief or disbelief¶78 Disbe-
lief is an attitude, while denial is an act that prepares grounds for disbelief. By avoiding asking 
the right questions, decision-makers arguably reinforce the existing culture of disbelief. 
 Additionally, this detached position aligns with the µobjective¶ stance decision-makers 
associate with their quasi-legal role.79 So far, I have stressed how the voice of the claimant is 
doubted. Since the testimony cannot be trusted, the body becomes the primary site of truth, an 
unmediated signifier for the well-founded fear of persecution required by international asylum 
law.80 Scars and wounds speak for the torture and injuries experienced in the past. This appeal 
to the µself-evident truth of the suffering body¶ is a characteristic of the humanitarian exception 
discourses.81 Such discourses appeal to the common vulnerability of all human beings and the 
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universality of human rights. Gündo÷GX warns against the discourse of corporeal vulnerability 
because it represents asylum seekers as µbare¶ humans rather than persons with political and 
civil rights. It depersonalizes refugees by representing them as suffering masses who need pity 
from society to be accepted into the political community. Another negative effect, derived from 
the latter point, is that it has incidentally produced a high threshold to be met by asylum-seek-
ers, namely the standard of µH[FHSWLRQDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶ signified by the exceptionally suffering 
body.82 As Baillot, Cowan and Munro note, this also translates into a hierarchy of suffering 
within the interview process: 
µOver time, the various stories risk being received as routine and mundane, to the extent 
that it may become difficult for decision-makers to approach each case afresh and avoid 
creating hierarchies of persecution which demand even higher levels of suffering to 
incite sympathy¶.83 
Gündo÷GX makes a similar argument,84 through a dissenting opinion in the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case N. v. United Kingdom.85 The asylum claim stated she 
had been raped by members of the National Resistance Movement in Uganda because she had 
links to the opposing faction, the Lord's Resistance Army.  She had HIV and her counsel argued 
she could not receive an adequate treatment in Uganda. Even though her appeal was rejected 
by the ECtHR, Gündo÷GX stresses how the dissenting opinion stated that her case met the test 
of µH[FHSWLRQDO circumstances¶86  Subsequent cases confirm this position, whereby foreign na-
tionals who suffer from grave illnesses can be removed from the UK, unless their situation 
                                                 
82
 Penelope Deutscher, µ7KH Inversion of Exceptionality: Foucault, Agamben, and ³5HSURGXFWLYH 5LJKWV´¶ (2008) 
107 South Atlantic Quarterly 55. 
83
 Baillot, Cowan and Munro (n 3) 532. 
84
 Ayten *QGR÷GX Rightlessness in an Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles of 
Migrants (OUP 2015)  
85
 N. v. United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 453   
86
 D. v. United Kingdom [1997] 24 EHRR 423 
meets the high-threshold of exceptionality,87 whereby deportation would interfere with the 
right not to suffer inhuman and degrading treatment (as guaranteed in the European Convention 
on Human Rights)88 . Underpinning this logic of exceptionality is the appeal to the µbare 
humanity¶ of asylum seekers, which ironically makes them µmuch more vulnerable to the arbi-
trary forms of violence¶89 by generalizing their identity into suffering bodies at the mercy of 
sympathy from decision-makers. But sympathy is restricted by a hierarchy of suffering, which 
prioritizes some claims over others. This strategy is not only a race to the bottom, but also robs 
asylum-seekers of an individual voice. The truth of the wounded body is meant to speak for 
the person as a referent to the truth of the testimony. But as the following passage from a refusal 
letter implies, the bodily scars may be real but the testimony can still be doubted if there is a 
contradiction between the scars and the story: 
µThe mere fact of the existence of scars does not, in itself, indicate that the injuries were 
sustained in the manner you have described. Consequently, given the lack of credibility 
evident in your claim overall, and in the absence of any other credible and independent 
evidence to support your assertions, it has been decided not to attach any weight to the 
presence of scars on your body¶.90  
While the UNHCR report interprets this quote as an example of incorrectly understanding med-
ical evidence in a status determination procedure, it also symbolizes the fragility of the testi-
mony insofar as it is deemed to be incomplete unless accompanied by an external referent, such 
as the body. However, the body fails to perform this function here. The question is, why are 
the testimonies considered to be so unreliable? Why do testimonies from asylum-seekers 
require a supplement or referent which attests to its credibility?  
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 Giorgio Agamben remarks that witnesses are expected to present a neutral account of 
the facts that enable others to make a judgment. To say that the witness is an objective spectator 
also implies she is detached from the event. Refugees are not only witnesses, but also survivors. 
Paradoxically, survivors cannot be witnesses at the same time, because their subjective position 
regarding the event calls into question their µidentity and reliability¶91  Judicial logic undercuts 
the ability of survivors to bear witness to their own survival. Psychoanalysis holds a similar 
conclusion. Caruth explains that a Freudian account of trauma is based on the idea that survi-
vors who repeatedly return to the past are meant to uncover a suppressed memory. But, because 
trauma arrives unexpectedly, as the subject is not fully cognizant of the traumatic event. For 
this reason, Caruth describes traumatic memories as µa history that literally has no place¶92 
Contrary to this general reading, where creation of memories is bound to the past, Caruth sug-
gests that trauma is activated by µincomprehensibility of a future that is not yet owned¶93 Inar-
ticulate language, such as stammering, signifies the repetition of trauma where one is trapped 
in between the shock of death and the incomprehensibility of surviving it. However, it also 
represents a µcreative act of parting¶ signaling an affirmation of life.94  Stammering language 
does not represent an inability to speak of the past but it can also be, like that of a babbling 
child, a language of playfulness. Memories from survivors are thus retrospective and prospec-
tive narratives, where one µdoes not simply point backward >«@ but bears witness to the past 
by pointing to the future¶95 Although this argument does not appease the judicial expectation 
for objectivity, or eliminate the expectation of a referent that can attest to the truth of the trau-
matic event, it counters the view that suffering bodies cannot speak because the narrative ap-
pears fragmented.   
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 To conclude this section, the status determination process demands the production of a 
credible and truthful account that will allow for a judgment. Although the asylum determina-
tion system strives to create the right conditions for hearing asylum-seekers stories during in-
terviews, the emphasis is on helping them narrate a credible testimony.96 Nonetheless, as sur-
vivors they are not regarded as credible witnesses. Instead the procedure systematically si-
lences the voices of asylum-seekers. This is done first through the fragmentation of the narra-
tives during the interviews, either because speech is broken down into question-answer for-
mats, or because the testimony is broken down to smaller components to assist translations. 
Second, the denial of the listener whose inability to hear contradictorily confirms organiza-
tional prejudices, as well as the belief that unbiased decisions are achieved through detachment. 
Since decision-makers appear to be deaf to the pain and suffering of asylum-seekers, thevul-
nerability of the body is emphasized in asylum petitions. This strategy backfires, not only be-
cause the courts adopt a high threshold for vulnerability, but also because the body is used as 
evidence to corroborate testimonies. Thus, bodies are invested as sites of truth, but this is a 
moot gesture which ultimately evinces the legal attitude towards the paradox of bearing witness 
to survival as the survivor. Ultimately, relying on the body as a referent is a symptom of the 
problem, which is the distrust towards the witness/survivor.  
 Although asylum-seekers are encouraged to speak, their testimonies are not trusted. 
Different measures in place to ensure hearing their stories are undermined by the cumulative 
distrust towards the testimony of refugees. The belief that survivors cannot be objective and 
neutral testifiers underpins this attitude which reads falsehood in the silences or incoherent 
gaps in the narrative of persecution. In this vicious cycle, the law hears only those who speak 
the language of law, for this reason, the perfect asylum-testimony is most likely the one that 
                                                 
96
 Gibson (n 69) 6. 
ventriloquizes the legal speech, or more precisely the one that adapts demonstrates its credibil-
ity through an objective, linear, coherent, and reasonable narrative. 
4. Lamentation: Hearing poetry in the gaps 
This final section examines elements of vocailty and repetitive stammering through the figure 
of lament and ritual supplication through The Suppliant Maidens by Aeschylus. The tragedy 
itself represents the drama of petitioning asylum through the story of the Danaids, a group of 
50 women who fled Egypt to escape unwanted marriages. My specific interest in the play is 
the overlap between rituals of supplication and lamentation. To be clear, the historical evidence 
of supplication laws is beyond the scope in this paper. My analysis simply elaborates this theme 
as represented in the literary text, to flesh out a reflection on how the law governing the refugee 
status determination may be failing to grasp the voice of asylum-seekers, because it does not 
adhere to its schemas of intelligibility explained above.  Feminist interpretations of lamentation 
expose why the sound of vulnerability was regulated and why it needs to be valorized again in 
the sphere of communication.         
 The plot begins before the Danaids arrive at the city gates of Argos. To petition for 
hospitality from the city, they need to beg at the altar of Zeus.97  Pelasgus, the King and guard-
ian of the city, comes to meet them and asks who they are and why they are asking for protec-
tion. Their answer does not convince him, for he doubts they are of Greek descent as they claim 
to be. He also worries that if he wrongly turns them back, then the city will be punished for not 
honoring moral and religious obligations towards strangers given by Zeus. Conversely, if pro-
tection is offered, the city could go to war with the Egyptides who will come to claim their 
brides. Seeing hesitation from Pelasgus, the Danaids threaten to hang themselves at the gates 
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of the city rather than go back. Agonizing, Pelasgus delegates the decision to the Argive people. 
The King appoints Danaus, the father of the Danaids, to represent the women and advices Da-
naus on how to convince the Argive citizenry. The tragedy ends on a cliff-hanger, since the 
Danaids celebrate after a victorious vote is tainted by the imminent threat of war against the 
Egyptides. 
 In Ancient Greece and Rome, ritual supplication meant µKHOS PH¶ and µspare me¶98  It 
is accompanied by specific gestures such as begging µby the beard, chin, or knee¶ to exert 
µsocial, moral, and religious pressure on them to grant RQHV¶ request¶99 There is nothing in the 
text which suggest they do this gesture. On the other hand, the text is plagued by references to 
lamentations, especially in the opening chorus. According to Loraux lament, defined as the 
poetic expression of grief, is found in the texts through repetitive onomatopoeic vocalizations, 
such as ³ai-ai´.100 She explains that lamentation was historically performed by women who 
wailed, tore their hair or inflicted wounds upon themselves. Further, she says scholars interpret 
lamentation as an uncontrollable excesses of female grief, that was heavily regulated because 
it could offset the desire to avenge a departed clan member and undermine Athens democrati-
zation.101 But the banishment and gradual feminization of lamentation did not only purify 
mourning from µGDQJHURXV¶ excesses. In the public sphere, it was transformed into a regulated 
expression of oration in funeral settings (known as epitaphios logos), understood as a secular-
ized and egalitarian collective eulogy for citizens who died in war.102 Funeral oration had a 
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 Nicole Loraux, The Invention of Athens: Funeral Oration in the Classical City (Alan Sheridan tr, Zone Books 
2006)  
functional objective: it presented death in battle as meaningful and desirable virtue for citi-
zens.103 Mourning did not completely disappear from the public sphere; it survived obliquely 
in tragedy. Tragic theater provided a space where the lamentation, expressed in a mimetic and 
feminized form, could be held at a distance.104 Still, Honig argues that theater represented an 
institutional exception, which although seemingly repressing unbounded excesses, was more 
like a µdisciplined domain within which some subversion was tolerated¶105 In the texts, lament 
appears in the phonetically repetitive interjection of ai-ai or referenced through the mourning 
mothers and virgins that populate the tragic genre. As Loraux suggests, lamentation is charac-
teristically described as musical expression of mourning but it is also represented through the 
figure of nightingales. This bird, which Loraux considers to be emblematic of lamentation, is 
often referenced by the Danaids in The Suppliant Maidens.106    
 Supplication converges with lamentation in this tragedy. First, it is identifiable in the 
choral odes, where the Danaids express the characteristic ambivalence of mourning between 
anger and pain (µoh mortal outrage, look down how it grows >«@ I sing suffering, shriek-
ing/Shrill and sad I am weeping/Ah my life in dirges/And rich lamentations¶).107 The Danaids 
call on the protection of Athena, patron of Athens, who is a virgin maiden like them (µthe pure 
daughter of Zeus, who guards sacred walls¶),108 hoping she will protect them. But if the goddess 
fails, they µshall go on in supplication to Zeus of the dead, who welcomes all strangers¶.109 
They call on their father Danaus for advice, who in turn cautions prudence and plainly re-
sponds: 
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Mournful, respectful, answer needfully/the strangers; tell distinctly of an exile unsus-
tained by murder. Let nothing bold/attend your voice, and nothing vain/come forth/ in 
glance but modesty and reverence/Not talkative nor yet laggard be in/ speech: the peo-
ple here are quick to take offense. Remember to yield: you are foreign refugees/ in 
QHHG«110 
His advice is poignant because it speaks to the expectations of the hosts, but the message 
is contradictory. On one hand, their voices must convey need, submission, and weakness. 
Yet, their lamentation must be measured to avoid offending the Argive citizens. Pelasgus 
is possibly hoping their lamentation will not be interpreted as sign of danger.111 As Loraux 
explains, male thinking fantasizes female lamentation as a threat to the city. Symbolically, 
mourning represents guilt for a murder in the past or yet to be done,112 tempered to avoid 
causing offense. Upon arrival, Pelasgus remarks that the women know about Greek prac-
tices because they have placed an olive branch by the altar of Zeus, but they do not look 
Greek at all. Restraining himself from judging them further, he says their µYRLFH¶ ought to 
clarify who they are.113  It is unclear what he means by µYRLFH¶ but it appears to refer to 
speech. After confirming the role Pelasgus as an authority figure in the city, the women 
promise to give a µbrief¶ and µFOHDU¶ story that ought to support their claim for refuge, which 
is that they have Argive ancestry.114He doubts this is true because of their darker skin and 
manner of speaking. To him, they look like Libyans, or µman-hating¶ >«@ carnivorous Am-
azons >«@ armed with bows¶115 Despite further requests for clarification, and the responses 
given by the Danaids, the King of Argos is not convinced they are who they are. He also 
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hesitates offering protection because he is afraid the Danaids cousins will come to reclaim 
their brides. 
 Analyzing why Pelasgus doubts the Danaids identity, namely that they are Greek 
women based on their Argive ancestry, Reed suggests there are repeated instances in the 
play which betray the Danaids story. 116  She argues that the phonic utterances of lamenta-
tion in the tragedy undercut the coherence of their story, making it seem as if they do not 
have a good command of the Greek language. This broken language not only appears to 
lack verbal signification but it reduces their voices to pure sounds. Specifically, these mean-
ingless sounds resemble the gibberish of barbarians.117 Their lamentations introduce a more 
fundamental contradiction to the testimony from the Danaids about what they are, whether 
human or animal-like creatures. Their lament appears not only as an excess of appeal to 
emotion (pathos) to be made subservient to logos or language, but it also contradicts their 
identity. Said otherwise, they claim to be Greek but the references to lamentation shows 
their testimony is untrue. Instead, they are foreigners whose phonic utterances signify bar-
barity (barbaros). The latter is an attribute Greeks gave to non-Greeks and an adjective 
used for incomprehensible speech as well animality,118 following the Aristotelian definition 
of ³rational man´. For Aristotle, the voice of man is different from animals because it sig-
nifies (semantike) and the voice of animals does not. Surely, it can be a µµVLJQ¶ [semeion] 
of pain or pleasure, a cry or yelp¶, which is thus equivalent to µan excess that is disturbingly 
close to animality¶.119 Therefore, Cavarero reiterates that his definition of man as a rational 
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animal is equivalent to a µVSHDNLQJ DQLPDO¶.120 Lamentation is then a cry that might be mis-
heard as the sound of animals or slaves. As Heath notes, Aristotle consistently compared 
slaves to animals which are µthe most obvious voiceless Others because their voice clearly 
lacks authority¶.121 The less the Argive king listens because he cannot make sense of what 
the Danaids say, the more their voices are close to being strangled, living a pain which 
cannot be uttered. While the gesture is a desperate plea for help, it also shuts down their 
vocal chords. This passage echoes the warning by Gündo÷GX, about the allure of seeking 
protection through the figure of bare life.122  
 Ultimately, we can see how the advice from Danaus to regulate their lament by pre-
senting a more moderate version that conforms to the norms of supplication ultimately fails. 
Anachronistic as this reading might be, The Suppliant Maidens offers an ancient allegory 
on the effacement of the voice in refugee status adjudication procedures. The voice of the 
survivor is a cry for help, brimming with excessive emotion, which is wrongly deemed 
superfluous and incommensurable with the linguistic system that separates phonetics from 
semantics. This incommensurability mirrors the excess represented by mourning in lamen-
tation. Despite attempts to regulate it, their speech is punctuated with the ambiguous per-
formance of animality and barbarity. In the end, the political community fails to hear the 
uniqueness of each voice because rules restrict access to those stories that are expressed 
coherently and rationally in the language of the host. We must perhaps return to the atten-
tion Cavarero gave to the genesis of narration, which echoes Caruth¶s thought on the life 
impulse represented by incomprehensible speech. Cavarero argues narration is not merely 
µ´reconstructing´ the thread of a life story¶ where one explains a life as a succession of 
events. 123 For example, how asylum decision-making rests on the assumption that what 
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matters in the asylum-seekers testimony is a clear and coherent narration of events that 
explain why a person is in need for protection. Instead, she argues that narration involves 
µopposing the work of destruction that devoured life itself¶124 Fragmentary language, inar-
ticulate cries, or imperceptible sounds, are not meaningless. These expressions communi-
cate the life of a unique person, whose story needs to oppose the destructive effect of si-
lence. 
5. Conclusion 
Bringing the arguments home, this article showed the different ways in which The Suppliant 
Maidens by Aeschylus allegorizes the challenges faced by vulnerable people in the adjudica-
tion of asylum claims. It stressed how the process of constructing the identity of a refugee is 
precarious and geared to make some claims fail from the start. While the testimony of asylum-
seekers is central for determination of their legal status, incoherencies, silences or any other 
form of speech fragmentation make them subject to doubt and mistrust by immigration author-
ities. In this climate of disbelief, worsened by xenophobic and anti-immigration policies, the 
discourse of humanitarian exception substitutes asylum-VHHNHUV¶ testimonies. However, the ex-
acerbation of the bare humanity of refugees creates a high bar only overcome by truly excep-
tional suffering bodies. My contention is that the inability to listen to these precarious testimo-
nies, or to mistranslate them as ³fake´ claims arises from the logic that attaches credibility, 
objectivity, and reason to narrative coherence. Stressing the intricate link between law and 
language and the limits of this convention in the legal discipline, this article opens a space to 
rethink testimony by refugees through a phonetic re-exploration of vulnerability. Rather than 
                                                 
124
 Ibid. 
unbinding these testimonies from the norms of language because they appear illegible, frag-
mented, generic sounds, this article gestured towards a response-ability to the singularity of 
voices. 
